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The present paper investigates the link between the shadow economy and FDI 
using the Granger panel causality test. For that purpose we use the shadow 
economy  and  FDI  data  for  145  countries  of  five  data  points  1999/2000, 
2001/2002,  2002/2003,  2003/2004  and  2004/2005.  The  system  GMM 
estimation results show that FDI causes the shadow economy and vice versa. 
The empirical evidence supports the hypotheses that higher FDI causes lower 
shadow economy and higher shadow economy causes higher FDI.  
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1. Introduction 
The  shadow  economy  is  a  phenomenon  known  throughout  the  world.  It  exists, 
especially, when governments apply excessive tax or unreasonably regulate economic 
activities. The shadow economy is a non-negligible part of economic activity whose 
economic volume occupies as much as 10 to 50 percent of the economy and without 
consideration of this important sector, it is impossible to evaluate the consequences of 
various  economic  policies.  This  is  a  particularly  serious  obstacle  in  developing 
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countries. Knowledge of the shadow economy will lead to a better understanding of 
the market system and hopefully to better economic policies.  
There is a large literature on the different methods of measurement of the shadow 
economy and a good review and criticism of them can be found in Lackó (1999), 
Schneider and Enste (2000) and Schneider (2005). 
The hidden nature of shadow economy makes it difficult to measure and study. 
That is why a majority of commonly used methods take use of indirect estimation. 
Such methods involve many restrictive hypotheses. There are three major methods for 
measurement of the size of shadow economy: 
1.  The methods based on microeconomic theories (Direct Approaches) 
2.  The methods based on macroeconomic theories (Indirect Approaches) 
3.  The Model Approach (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes, MIMIC) 
There is a large body of literature
5 on the possible causes and indicators of the shadow 
economy. In almost all studies
6 it has been ascertained that the overall tax and social 
security  contribution  burdens  are  among  the  main  causes  for  the  existence  of  the 
shadow economy but in most of these studies, tax burden is considered nationally and 
the effects of tax avoidance in a global scale is not mentioned.  
In  fact,  capital’s  ability to cross borders without restriction has left nationally 
based tax systems struggling to protect themselves from tax avoidance. The rise of the 
tax avoidance industry has coincided with a trend towards using tax competition as a 
strategy for attracting inwards investment, with widespread use of export processing 
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zones, tax holidays, accelerated depreciation rates, fiscal subsidies and preferential tax 
terms.  So tax competition has led to many governments cutting tax rates on income 
earned  by  non-residents  in  order  to  attract  portfolio  and  foreign  direct  investment 
(FDI).  
Faced  with  this  threat  to  their  tax  revenues,  governments  have  increasingly 
resorted to shifting the tax burden from capital to labor, despite this being in most 
instances  both  regressive  and  counter-productive  from  an  employment  creation 
perspective. Therefore, shifting tax burden from capital to labor and consumption to 
attract FDI, induce them towards the shadow economy activities. This is the views of 
those who focused on the dark side of FDI.  Against this view, there are those who 
look  on  the  bright  side  of  FDI  and  argue  that  it  affects  economic  growth  and 
government tax revenues positively in a variety of ways and ultimately decrease the 
shadow economy. 
On the other hand, not only the economic, but also the political system affects the 
shadow economic activities. In an inefficient state where corruption is rampant the 
citizens will have little trust in the authority and thus a low incentive to be active in 
the formal economy. Recent studies show that countries with high level of corruption 
have  a  higher  share  of  shadow  economy.  The  large  body  of  literature  on  the 
relationship  between  corruption  and  FDI  has  suggested  that  the  relationship  is 
theoretically  ambiguous;  therefore  how  shadow  economy  affects  FDI  is  also 
ambiguous. 
Although the casual relationship between shadow economy and FDI is important 
for economic policies, it has received less attention and there is no empirical study on 
this issue.  In this paper we aim at filling this  gap using recent causality methods 
developed for panel data (Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)).   4 
2. Relative Literatures and Hypotheses   
In this section we explore the relationship between the shadow economy and FDI and 
formulate concrete hypotheses. We thereby combine two strands of the literature. The 
first  deals  with  the  impact  of  FDI  on  the  shadow  economy;  the  second  with  the 
influence of the shadow economy on FDI. In both strands there are important gaps. 
2.1. The Impacts of FDI on Shadow Economy  
The scale of tax avoidance activity can be described as a shadow economy operating 
in  the  majority  of  globalizes  sectors  (Christensen  and  Kapoor,  2004).  The 
multinational enterprise (MNE) is the embodiment of globalization and its principal 
agent. MNEs are the “face” of globalization which offers the ability to create value-
adding activities that can improve national competitiveness, thereby contributing to 
economic growth and national welfare (Eden, 1995). MNEs also generate FDI flows 
(Gorgodze, 2004). 
In the mid-1980s and 1990s, MNE state relations shifted from confrontation to 
cooperation. Governments moved from regulating to encouraging entry, from taxing 
to subsidizing, from opposition to FDI to partnership with multinationals (Murtha and 
Lenway, 1994). 
At the end of the 1990s, Vernon (1998) argued that the current calm period in 
MNE-state relations was the “eye in the hurricane”. Some authors predict that this 
period  of  calm  is  now  ending,  as  globalization  creates  a  backlash  in  the  OECD 
countries  against  multinationals  and  international  organizations  (Graham,  2000; 
Rodrik, 1997; Rugman, 2000; Vernon, 1998). Thus, the multinational enterprise is 
Janus, the two faced -dark and bright- symbol of globalization (Eden and Lenway, 
2001).    5 
      Those who focus on the dark side of the MNE, argue that when a MNE undertakes 
FDI,  it  does  so  through  a  two  stage  process.  First,  the  MNE  researches  several 
possible locations and narrows its focus to a handful of potential sites. Then these 
potential locations bid against one another by offering firm-specific tax reductions and 
other incentives to the firm to ensure that they become the host (Davies, 2005). 
The rise of the tax avoidance industry has coincided with a trend towards using 
tax competition as a strategy for attracting inwards investment, with widespread use 
of  export  processing  zones,  accelerated  depreciation  rates,  fiscal  subsidies, 
preferential tax terms and tax havens (Christensen and Kapoor, 2004). Tax havens 
share a number of defining characteristics, most importantly low or zero tax rates on 
offer to non-residents and transaction secrecy (Tanzi, 2000). A low rate in itself is a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for a tax haven (Killian, 2006)
7. 
The  logic  of    tax  competition  requires  either  that  all  businesses  must  move 
offshore in order to compete on a level basis, or that onshore tax authorities adjust 
their tax regimes to place a greater burden on other factors of production (particularly 
labor) and onto consumption, as has been the trend in many countries for the past
8.  
Capital’s ability to cross borders without restriction has left nationally based tax 
systems  struggling  to  protect  themselves  from  tax  avoidance  by  high  net  worth 
individuals and profits-laundering by transnational businesses. At the same time tax 
competition has led to many governments cutting tax rates on income earned by non-
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residents in order to attract portfolio and foreign direct investment. Faced with this 
dual threat to their tax revenues, governments in developed and developing countries 
have increasingly resorted to shifting the tax burden from capital to labor, despite this 
being in most instances both regressive and counter-productive from an employment 
creation perspective. So tax competition between states can be economically harmful 
in a number of ways: 
1-  Tax  competition  shifts  the  tax  burden  between  different  factors  of            
production and between different types of economic activity, thereby increasing 
the costs of labor in relation to capital and encouraging short term speculative 
activity to the detriment of fixed, long-term investment; 
2- The greater mobility of high net worth individuals and MNEs enables them to 
make  full  use  of  offshore  tax  vehicles,  thereby  undermining  the  integrity  and 
equity of tax structures and creating a free-rider economy; 
3- The use of elaborate and typically aggressive tax avoidance structures increases 
the administrative burden of revenue collection; and 
4- Widespread tax evasion and avoidance increases income disparities within and 
between nation states, and is symptomatic of the withdrawal of wealthy  elites 
from their economic and social obligations. 
Tax competition and tax havens reduce tax revenues that could otherwise contribute 
to public services, development, and the reduction of poverty (Lewis, 2006). 
In a world where there are taxes on international transactions or where the rates of 
business income taxation differ across countries, then a multinational enterprise has   7 
financial incentives to choose strategically a transfer price
9 to reduce the amount of 
taxation paid in the importing and exporting countries.  
Another  action  to  be  taken  in  response  to  changes  in  tax  rates  is  to  manage 
earnings levels across accounting periods to minimize the tax liability of the firm 
through  time.  When  tax  rates  are  known  to  be  reduced,  firms  are  motivated  to 
decelerate  the  recognition  of  income.  This  phenomenon,  often  called  earnings 
management  or  income  smoothing  has  been  extensively  studied  through  the  late 
1980s  and1990s,  particularly  in  the  context  of  the  US  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986 
(Killian, 2006). 
In  conclusion,  the  recent  wave  of  MNEs  has  been  directed  towards  countries 
offering a suit of incentives through tax competition to attract FDI categorized as tax 
havens. Although tax havens offer low or zero tax rates to MNEs, they adjust their tax 
regimes to place a grater burden on other factors of production especially labor and 
consumption and induce them towards shadow activities. On the other hand, MNEs 
tend to take more advantages through tax havens by managing earning and transfer 
pricing so shadow economy increases in these countries. In summary we expect: 
             Hypothesis 1: Higher FDI causes higher shadow economy.  
On the other hand, those who look on the bright side of MNEs, argue that FDI 
affects government tax revenues positively in a variety of ways. For example, higher 
investment  levels  in  a  country  are  expected  to  increase  production,  thus  directly 
increasing domestic taxes on income, and on goods and services if the production is 
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sold  in  the  country,  and  indirectly  through  increases  in  the  quantity  and  perhaps 
quality of domestic income that result in higher levels of income taxes if it is sold 
abroad. Part of the production inputs could also be imported, thus again constituting a 
potential increase in taxes on international trade. Furthermore, as it is also argued that 
FDI will foster greater activity in the domestic firms participating in the production 
chain, and thus,  expected higher productivity of these firms provide an additional 
channel through which tax revenues are expected to increase. Of course the above 
analysis is dependent on the type of FDI, the sector where is it embedded, and the 
potential externalities that are expected to generate, but the overall effect is generally 
expected to be positive. In sum it is argued that FDI motivates the tax system reform 
in a way that it causes tax evasion reduction. Then it is expected that by increasing 
FDI, the shadow economy decreases.  
But even if the above effects have been theoretically analyzed, the empirical work 
on the effect of FDI on shadow economy is almost nonexistent, and thus its direction 
and magnitude still unreported. The only exception is the working paper of Vacaflores 
(2006), who studies the impact of FDI on tax revenue in Latin America during 1980-
2002, by estimating the dynamic panel model with system GMM. He finds that FDI 
has a positive effect on central government tax revenues. 
      Hypothesis 2: Higher FDI causes lower shadow economy. 
2.2. The Impacts of Shadow Economy on FDI  
The present authors are unaware of any studies on the issue of relationship between 
shadow economy and FDI. This paper therefore seeks to address this very issue. It 
will  do  so  by  linking  the  theme  of  shadow  economy  to  corruption  that  has  been 
playing an important role in attracting FDI.   9 
       Studies  have  indicated  that  political  system  can  affects  formal  and  informal 
economic activities. Torgler and Schneider (2007) find strong support that governance 
and  institutional  quality  increase  leads  to  a  smaller  shadow  economy.  If  citizens 
perceive  that  their  interests  (preferences)  are  properly  represented  in  political 
institutions and they receive an adequate supply of public goods, their identification 
with the state increases, their willingness to contribute increases.  
On the other hand, in an inefficient state where corruption is rampant the citizens 
will  have  little  trust  in  the  authority  and  thus  a  low  incentive  to  cooperate.  A 
sustainable  tax  system  is  based  on  a  fair  tax  system  and  responsive  government, 
achieved with a strong connection between tax payments and the supply of public 
goods (Bird et al., 2006). Friedman et al. (2000) show empirically that countries with 
more corruption have a higher share of unofficial economy. Dreher and Schneider 
(2006)  have  also  investigated  the  correlation  between  shadow  economy  and 
corruption.  They  observe  the  tendency  that  shadow  economy  and  corruption  are 
substitutes in high-income countries, but complements in low-income countries.  
In  countries  where  corruption  is  systemic  and  the  government  budget  lacks 
transparency and accountability the obligation of paying taxes cannot be assumed to 
be an accepted social norm. Institutional instability, lack of transparency and rule of 
law  undermine  the  willingness  of  frustrated  citizens  to  be  active  in  the  formal 
economy. Citizens will feel cheated if they believe that corruption is widespread, their 
tax burden is not spent well, their government lacks accountability, and that they are 
not protected by the rules of law. This increases the incentive to enter the informal 
sector. Thus an increase in corruption increases the size of shadow economy. 
The  relationship  between  corruption  -  which  increases  shadow  economy-  and 
FDI, should be observed by making use of data on FDI. Wheeler and Mody (1992)   10 
did not find a significant correlation between the size of FDI and the host country's 
risk  factor  -  which  included  corruption  among  other  variables  and  was  highly 
correlated with corruption. Another insignificant finding is reported by Alesina and 
Weder (1999).  
More  recent  studies  provide  evidence  in  favor  of  corruption  deterring  foreign 
investors. Focusing on bilateral flows between 14 sources and 45 host countries in 
1990 and 1991, Wei (2000a) detects a significant negative impact of corruption on 
FDI. Aizenman and Spiegel (2003) reveal a negative impact of corruption, measured 
by  the  BI-data,  on  the  ratio  of  FDI  to  total  capital  accumulation  for  a  variety  of 
regressions.  
 Lambsdorff and Cornelius (2000) show an adverse impact of corruption on FDI 
for  the  African  countries.  Abed  and  Davoodi  (2002)  obtain  a  negative  impact  of 
corruption  on  the  US-Dollar  per  capita  value  of  FDI  for  a  cross-section  of  24 
transition  countries.  Doh  and  Teegen  (2003)  show  that  investments  in  the 
telecommunications industry are adversely affected by the extent of corruption. 
 Smarzynska and Wei (2000) provide evidence in a similar vein for corruption to 
reduce firm-level assessments of FDI in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
In  another  study,  Wei  (2000b)  and  Wei  and  Wu  (2001)  also  hint  at  corruption 
reducing foreign direct investments.  
Habib and Zurawicki (2001; 2002) also provide evidence in the line of corruption 
deterring foreign direct investments. They found that the impact of corruption on FDI 
to be larger than that on local investment.  
But FDI represent only a minor fraction of a country's total capital inflows. In 
order to ascertain the negative welfare consequences of corruption, it is vital to prove   11 
its adverse effect on total capital inflows. The impact of corruption on these total net 
capital imports is proven in Lambsdorff (2003). In a cross-section of 65 countries, 
corruption is shown to decrease capital inflows at a 99 % confidence level. 
      Hypothesis 3: Higher shadow economy causes lower FDI. 
On the other hand, in some cases, foreign investors use illegitimate means to 
“persuade”  governments  to  allow  them  to  invest.  Bribery  is  also  common  when 
foreign companies are only prepared to invest if they can secure special privileges. 
Corrupt governments make agreements with foreign firms, which allow the firms to 
do business on very favorable terms, often to the economic disadvantage of the local 
population. Foreign direct investment often involves contracts in which the foreign 
investor  gains  the  profits  and  the  government  bears  the  risk  (Anti  Corruption 
Resource  Center,  ACRC).    In  Addition,  by  increasing  corruption  and  shadow 
economy, government revenues decreases –citizen don’t contribute to pay tax – then 
for  compensating  budget  deficit,  government  attract  FDI  by  giving  privilege  to 
foreign investors.  Egger and Winner (2005) empirically find a clear positive relation 
between corruption and FDI for a sample of 73 countries and time period 1995-1999.  
             Hypothesis 4: Higher shadow economy causes higher FDI. 
3. Empirical Model, Methodology and the Data  
3.1. Model  
The  empirical  model  is  aimed  at  investigating  the  Granger  Casual  relationship 
between shadow economy and FDI using dynamic panel system GMM estimators. 
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Where the causality-based variables  x and  y  are FDI or shadow economy. We 
use three major control variables ( z ) as mediators between shadow economy and FDI 
including economic growth, economic freedom and institutional quality.   
Although  the  review  of  recent  literature  shows  that  the  relationship  between 
shadow economy and economic growth is ambiguous, Nikopour et al. (2008) by using 
Kuznet’s curve and data for 21 selected OECD countries for time period 1995-2006 
empirically show that there is a positive relationship between shadow economy and 
economic growth. On the other hand, the empirical studies show that there is a bi-
directional  causality  between  FDI  and  economic  growth  and  this  relationship  is 
positive (Chowdhury and Mavrotas, 2005).  
Using  different  restrictions  on  economic  activities  by  government,  financial, 
labor, trade and investment markets and also property rights causes economic freedom 
decreasing and force peoples and firms towards shadow economy activities. On the 
other hand, increasing economic freedom by reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers and 
liberalizing domestic financial system, increases FDI. 
The  importance  of  institutional  quality  factor  has  caught  the  attention  of 
economists  in  a  variety  of  fields.  North  (1990)  defines  institutions  as  the  human 
constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They comprise 
both formal rules (property rights, constitutions and laws) and informal constraints 
(unwritten taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct). When the rules change 
persistently or are not respected, when corruption is widespread and rule enforcement 
is fragile, or when property rights are not well defined, there is likely to be a problem 
with the quality of the institutions. Since the allocation of resources, the delivery of 
services and fair judgment will be less than desirable and the actual achievements will 
be  less  than  the  supposed  aims.  Problems  related  to  institutional  quality  may  be   13 
translated into an increased degree of uncertainty that sends misleading signals to the 
market,  thus  affecting  the  productive  economic  process  (Law  and  Azman-Saini, 
2008).  
3.2. Econometric Methodology  
In this paper, Granger-causality tests will be performed with panel data, which present 
a  problem  associated  with  dynamic  panel  data  analyses.  The  general  dynamic 
relationship is characterized by the presence of lagged regressors, which include apart 
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Where  T t ,..., 1 =  is time and  N i ,... 1 = is cross section andm ,  n and  r are the 
number of lags. It is assumed that the  it u  follow a one-way error component model: 
it t i it v u + + = λ µ                                                                 (2) 
Where  ( )
2 , 0 ~ µ σ µ IID i   is  the  unobserved  country-specific  effect, 
( )
2 , 0 ~ λ σ λ IID t  represents period-specific effects and  ( )
2 , 0 ~ v it IID v σ  the error term.  
The dynamic panel data regressions described in (1) and (2) are characterized by two 
sources of persistence over time, Autocorrelation due to the presence of a lagged 
dependent  variable  among  the  regressors  and  individual  effects  characterizing  the 
heterogeneity among the individuals. Since  it y  is a function of i µ , it follows that  1 , − t i y  
is also a function of  i µ . Therefore,  1 , − t i y , a right-hand regressor in (1) is correlated 
with the error term. This renders the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent even if the 
it v  are not serially correlated.   14 
In panel estimation, neither the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator nor 
the Fixed Effect (FE) estimator will produce consistent estimates in the presence of 
dynamics and endogenous regressors (Baltagi 1995). Arellano and Bond (1991) have 
proposed a dynamic panel General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator which is an 
IV estimator that uses all past values of endogenous regressors as well as current 
values of strictly exogenous regressors as instruments. Estimates can be based on first 
difference, or on orthogonal deviations.  
Arellano-  Bond  estimation  starts  by  transforming  all  regressors,  usually  by 
differencing, and uses the Generalized Method of Moments (Hansen 1982), and so is 
called  Difference  GMM.  The  Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond  estimator  augments 
Arellano-Bond  by  making  an  additional  assumption,  that  first  differences  of 
instrument  variables  are  uncorrelated  with  the  fixed  effects.  This  allows  the 
introduction of more instruments, and can dramatically improve efficiency. It builds a 
system of two equations-the original equation as well as the transformed one- and is 
known as System GMM. It is preferred to difference GMM since finite sample bias 
problem caused by weak instruments in first differenced GMM will be addressed by 
using system GMM. It also offers forward orthogonal deviations, an alternative to 
differencing that preserves sample size in panels with gaps. And it allows finer control 
over the instrument matrix.   
Both Difference GMM and System GMM are general estimators designed for 
situations with 1) “small T, large N" panels, meaning few time periods and many 
individuals; 2) a linear functional relationship; 3) a single left-hand-side variable that 
is dynamic, depending on its own past realizations; 4) independent variables that are 
not strictly exogenous, meaning correlated with past and possibly current realizations 
of the error; 5) fixed individual effects; and 6) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation   15 
within individuals but not across them. Arellano and Bond proposed two estimators -
one- and two-step estimators- with the two-step estimator being the optimal estimator.  
The Sargan/Hansen test of over- identifying restrictions is performed which is a joint 
test of model specification and appropriateness of the instrument.   
 The test of whether  x Granger-causes  y  consists of a test of the hypothesis that 
n β β β = = = ... 2 1  are equal to zero (Wald test) after controlling for 
, y s own lags and 
the influence of additional controls ( z ). 
3.3. Data 
Until few years ago, quantitative analyses of interactions between variables such as 
shadow economy, indexes of rule of law, corruption and economic freedom have been 
virtually  impossible.  Fortunately,  the  recent  availability  of  data  on  the  scope  of 
shadow  economy  now  makes  such  a  study  possible.  In  particular,  we  refer  to 
Schneider’s (2005, 2007) estimates of the shadow economy as percentage of official 
GDP.  The  collected  data  set  consists  of  five  data  points  (1999/2000,  2001/2002, 
2002/2003, 2003/2004 and 2004/2005) for 145 countries
10.  
The Heritage Foundation has provided economic freedom index since 1995. The 
index of economic freedom conceive uses 10 specific freedoms; (i) Business freedom, 
(ii) Trade freedom, (iii) Fiscal freedom, (iv) Government size, (v) Monetary freedom,  
(vi) Investment freedom, (vii) Financial freedom, (viii) Property rights, (ix) Freedom 
from corruption and (x) Labor freedom (Beach and Kane, 2008). The definition of the 
above economic freedom indicators are provided in Table 2 (Appendix). Since labor 
freedom is available only for recent years and not for the time period used in this 
paper,  we  used  average  of  these  nine  indicators  as  an  Economic  Freedom.  It  is 
                                                 
10 - The Definition of indicators is shown in Appendix (Table 2) and the list of countries in the sample 
is shown in Appendix (Table 5).   16 
expected that the activities of the shadow economy decrease and FDI increase with 
increasing economic freedom. 
The  institutional  quality  data  sets  we  employed  in  the  analysis  are  newly 
assembled dataset by Kaufmann et al. (2008). These indicators are constructed based 
on information gathered through a wide variety of cross-country surveys as well as 
polls of experts. Kaufmann et al. (2008) use a model of unobserved components, 
which enables them to achieve levels of coverage of approximately 212 countries for 
each of their indicators. They construct six different indicators, each representing a 
different dimension of governance: (i) Voice and Accountability, (ii) Political Stability 
and Lack of Violence, (iii) Government Effectiveness, (iv)Regulatory Quality, (v) Rule 
of  Law,  and  (vi)  Control  of  Corruption.  The  definition  of  the  above  institutional 
quality  indicators  are  provided  in  Table  2  (Appendix).  Because  of  collinearity 
between  theses  indicators,  we  defined  average  of  voice  and  accountability,  and 
political stability as the Political Freedom and Stability and average of government 
effectiveness,  regulatory  quality,  rule  of  law  and  corruption  as  the  Government 
Efficiency. We expect an increase in governance and institutional quality reduces the 
size of the shadow economy and increase FDI.  
4. The Empirical Results 
We explore the Granger causality between shadow economy and FDI using two step 
system GMM method with t-values and test statistics that are asymptotically robust to 
general heteroscedasticity and corrected for a small sample bias.  
The estimates of the shadow economy equations are presented in Table 3a which 
its columns present different specifications of the shadow economy equation. In all 
models the variable of interest is FDI.     17 
In specification (1), no control variable is used while in specification (2), GDP 
growth  rate  is  used  as  a  control  variable.  In  specification  (3),  economic  freedom 
variable is added to GDP growth rate as another control variable and in specification 
(4) indicator of political freedom and stability is added to GDP growth rate as the 
other  control  variable  and  finally  in  specification  (5)  the  government  efficiency 
indicator is added to GDP growth rate as a control variable.  
All models include a set of year dummies. In all specifications, year dummies and 
levels equation are used as instrument variables because all other regressors are not 
strictly exogenous. The shadow economy equation fits the data well as indicated by 
the regression statistics.  
Two  types  of  diagnostic  test  are  used  for  the  empirical  models.  Firstly  we 
conducted the test of first and second order serial correlation in the residuals. The   
AR (2) test statistics of the residuals do not reject the specification of the error term in 
all models except for model (1). Secondly, the Hansen test statistics indicate that the 
shadow  economy  equation  for  all  specifications  is  well  specified  and  that  the 
instrument vector is appropriate. Test statistics also reject the null hypothesis that the 
time dummies are jointly equal to zero at the one percent level.  
The results suggest that there is no significant relationship between FDI and the 
shadow economy except for model (2) in which FDI has a negative significant impact 
on shadow economy. The economic growth rate in all specifications has a statistically 
significant positive effect on the shadow economy. In specifications 3-5 economic 
freedom, political freedom and stability and government efficiency have a statistically 
significant negative effect on the shadow economy respectively.    18 
The Granger causality test (Wald test) is used for specification (2) since only in 
that FDI has a statistically significant impact on shadow economy. The result of this 
test suggests that FDI causes shadow economy. That is, past information on FDI help 
improve prediction of the shadow economy. Thus, the empirical evidence supports the 
second hypothesis that higher FDI causes lower shadow economy although this result 
is not robust.   
For  double  robustness  checks,  we  drop  outlier  the  shadow  economy  data  – 
countries their shadow economy is more than 60% of GDP
11. The results in Table 3b 
confirm the above mentioned results. 
The different specification estimates of FDI equation are presented in Table 4a. 
All models are specified the same as shadow economy equation and the variable of 
interest  is  shadow  economy.  All  models  include  a  set  of  year  dummies.  In  all 
specifications,  only  year  dummies  and  levels  equation  are  used  as  instrument 
variables because all other regressors are not strictly exogenous. The FDI equation fits 
the data well as indicated by regression statistics.  
The AR (2) test statistics of the residuals do not reject the specification of the 
error term in all models. The Hansen test statistics also indicate that the FDI equation 
in all specifications is well specified and the instrument vector is appropriate. Test 
statistics also reject the null hypothesis that the time dummies are jointly equal to zero 
at one percent level.  
The results suggest that in all specifications, shadow economy has a statistical 
significant positive effect on FDI. Although in specifications 2-5, economic growth 
rate has a positive effect on FDI, only in specifications 3 and 5 this positive effect is 
statistically significant. In specifications 3-5 economic freedom, political freedom and 
                                                 
11 - These countries including: Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Georgia, Panama, Peru, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.   19 
stability  and  government  efficiency  have  a  positive  effect  on  FDI  respectively 
although only government efficiency is statistically significant in specification 5.  
The results of the Granger causality test (Wald test) suggest that shadow economy 
causes FDI in all models. That is, past information on shadow economy help improve 
prediction of FDI. Thus, the empirical evidence supports the fourth hypothesis that 
higher shadow economy causes higher FDI.  
For  double  robustness  checks,  we  drop  outlier  the  shadow  economy  data  – 
countries their shadow economy is more than 60% of GDP- and added three extra 
control  variables  including  labor  force,  human  capital  and  capital  formation 
(investment). The results in Table 4b confirm the above mentioned results. 
6. Conclusion 
The present paper examines the link between shadow economy and FDI using the 
Granger panel causality test. To our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates 
the relationship between these two variables. For that purpose we use the shadow 
economy and FDI data for 145 countries of five data points 1999/2000, 2001/2002, 
2002/2003, 2003/2004 and 2004/2005.  
In this way we thereby combine two strands of the literature. The first deals with 
the impact of FDI on the shadow economy; the second with the influence of the 
shadow economy on FDI. In both strands there are important gaps. In this study we 
formulate four hypotheses: 
       Hypothesis 1: Higher FDI causes higher shadow economy.  
       Hypothesis 2: Higher FDI causes lower shadow economy. 
       Hypothesis 3: Higher shadow economy causes lower FDI. 
       Hypothesis 4: Higher shadow economy causes higher FDI.   20 
The system GMM results support that FDI causes the shadow economy and vice 
versa. That is, past information on FDI help improve prediction of shadow economy 
and vice versa. Although the empirical evidence supports the robustness of fourth 
hypothesis, the second hypothesis that higher FDI causes lower shadow economy is 
not robust. Since FDI represent only  a minor fraction of  country’s  economy, this 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Characteristics of sample data  
Variable  Source 
Unit of 
Measurement  Mean  Standard 
deviation  Minimum  Maximum  Obs. 
Shadow Economy   Schneider (2007)  US$,Billion  73.63  158.25  0.060  1379.6  704 
FDI   UNCTAD  US$,Billion  5.48  18.07  -21.15  298.84  715 
Economic Growth   IMF  %  7.81  4.77  -12.93  43.04  703 
Economic Freedom  
Heritage 
Foundation  %  60.01  10.30  23.96  90.06  640 
Government Effectiveness  
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008) 
Standard 
deviation  50.35  27.87  1.65  100  723 
Control of Corruption  
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008) 
Standard 
deviation  48.69  28.22  0.24  100  720 
Voice and Accountability  
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008) 
Standard 
deviation  49.34  27.55  2.16  100  725 
Political Stability  
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008) 
Standard 
deviation  45.59  27.74  0.24  99.75  710 
Rule of Law  
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008) 
Standard 
deviation  47.78  27.88  0.71  100  722 
Regulatory Quality  
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008) 
Standard 
deviation  50.04  27.51  0.97  99.76  720 
Labor Force  WDI  Person  2.02e+7  7.40e+7  35853.3  7.70+e8  695 
Human Development 
Index(HDI) 
  UNDP  0-1  0.681  0.198  0.129  0.967  680 
Gross Capital Formation 
(Investment) 
WDI  % of GDP  22.37  7.14  3.27  59.09  675 
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Shadow economy   The shadow economy includes all market-based legal production of goods and services that are 
deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following reasons: to avoid or evasion 
payment  of  income,  value  added  or  other  taxes,  to  avoid  payment  of  social  security 
contributions, to avoid having to meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum 
wages, maximum working hours, safety standards, etc., and  to avoid complying with certain 
administrative procedures, such as completing statistical questionnaires or other administrative 
forms. 
Governance Indicators    
Voice and Accountability   The extent to which country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as 
well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media 
Political Stability   The perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism 
Government Effectiveness   The quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from  political  pressures,  the  quality  of  policy  formulation  and  implementation,  and  the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies 
Regulatory Quality   The ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development 
Rule of Law   The extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence 
Corruption   The extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests 
Economic freedom   Encompasses all liberties and rights of production, distribution, or consumption of goods and 
services. 
Business freedom  The  ability  to  create,  operate,  and  close  an  enterprise  quickly  and  easily.  Burdensome, 
redundant regulatory rules are the most harmful barriers to business freedom. 
Trade freedom  A composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect imports and 
exports of goods and services. 
Fiscal freedom  A measure of the burden of government from the revenue side. It includes both the tax burden 
in terms of the top tax rate on income (individual and corporate separately) and the overall 
amount of tax revenue as a portion of gross domestic product (GDP). 
Government size  Defined to include all government expenditures, including consumption and transfers. Ideally, 
the state will provide only true public goods, with an absolute minimum of expenditure. 
Monetary freedom  Combines a measure of price stability with an assessment of price controls. Both inflation and 
price controls distort market activity. Price stability without microeconomic intervention is the 
ideal state for the free market. 
Investment freedom  An assessment of the free flow of capital, especially foreign capital. 
Financial freedom  A  measure  of  banking  security  as  well  as  independence  from  government  control.  State 
ownership of banks and other financial institutions such as insurer and capital markets is an 
inefficient burden, and political favoritism has no place in a free capital market. 
Property rights  An assessment of the ability of individuals to accumulate private property, secured by clear 
laws that are fully enforced by the state. 
Freedom from corruption  Based on quantitative data that assess the perception of corruption in the business environment, 
including levels of governmental legal, judicial, and administrative corruption. 
Labor freedom  A composite measure of the ability of workers and businesses to interact without restriction by 
the state. 
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Table 3a: Effect of FDI on shadow economy, two step system GMM estimation 
Dependent variable:  ( )t shadow log   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 





























t eedom economicfr ) log(      
-0.147 
(-2.04)** 
   




t efficincy government ) log(          
-0.023 
(-2.62)* 







































Number of observation  549  536  489  532  536 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1), (p value)  0.803  0.003  0.012  0.002  0.003 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2), (p value)  0.043  0.145  0.509  0.431  0.476 
Hansen test of overid.  (p value)  0.596  0.232  0.218  0.209  0.231 
Wald test ( ) 0 ) log( : 1 0 = − t FDI H     (4.48)**       
Wald test ( ) 0 : 0 = DUM H   (64.51)*  (97.97)*  (89.14)*  (127.48)*  (117.01)* 
Notes: All models are estimated using the Arellano and Bond dynamic panel system GMM estimations 
(Stata xtabond2 command). Figures in the parentheses are t-statistics. * Significant at the 1 percent 
level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level and*** Significant at the 10 percent level. Political Freedom 
and Stability = average of voice & accountability and political stability. Government Efficiency = 
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Table 3b: Effect of FDI on shadow economy, two step system GMM estimation 
(Robustness Checks) 
Dependent variable:  ( )t shadow log   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 





























t eedom economicfr ) log(      
-0.136 
(-1.75)*** 
   
( )t stability reedom politicalf & log         -0.018 
(-1.52)   
t efficincy government ) log(          
-0.022 
(-2.83)* 







































Number of observation  521  512  465  508  512 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1), (p value)  0.669  0.002  0.009  0.002  0.002 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2), (p value)  0.019  0.155  0.647  0.390  0.475 
Hansen test of overid.  (p value)  0.543  0.298  0.230  0.197  0.238 
Wald test ( ) 0 ) log( : 1 0 = − t FDI H     (4.99)**       
Wald test ( ) 0 : 0 = DUM H   (144.84)*  (95.58)*  (80.70)*  (112.29)*  (110.25)* 
Notes: All models are estimated using the Arellano and Bond dynamic panel system GMM estimations 
(Stata xtabond2 command). Figures in the parentheses are t-statistics. * Significant at the 1 percent 
level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level and*** Significant at the 10 percent level. Political Freedom 
and Stability = average of voice & accountability and political stability. Government Efficiency = 
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Table 4a: Effect of shadow economy on FDI, two step system GMM estimation 
Dependent variable:  ( )t FDI log   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 




























t eedom economicfr ) log(       1.372 
(1.47)     
( )t stability reedom politicalf & log         0.282 
(1.21)   
t efficincy government ) log(           0.455 
(1.96)*** 










) 2003 / 2002 ( DUM   -0.161 
(-2.22)** 
-0.192 
(-1.78)***      -0.179 
(-1.75)*** 
) 2004 / 2003 ( DUM   -0.054 
(-0.84) 
-0.101 
(-1.68)***      -0.765 
(-1.60) 










Number of observation  540  527  483  523  527 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1), (p value)  0.025  0.022  0.006  0.017  0.032 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2), (p value)  0.600  0.462  0.255  0.378  0.517 
Hansen test of overid.  (p value)  0.593  0.636  0.467  0.402  0.587 
Wald test ( ) 0 ) log( : 1 0 = − t shadow H   (8.58)*  (9.03)*  (22.29)*  (4.24)**  (5.76)** 
Wald test ( ) 0 : 0 = DUM H   (2.90)***  (2.69)***  (7.59)*  (11.78)*  (4.32)** 
Notes: All models are estimated using the Arellano and Bond dynamic panel system GMM estimations 
(Stata xtabond2 command). Figures in the parentheses are t-statistics. * Significant at the 1 percent 
level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level and*** Significant at the 10 percent level. Political Freedom 
and Stability = average of voice & accountability and political stability. Government Efficiency = 
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Table 4b: Effect of shadow economy on FDI, two step system GMM estimation 
(Robustness Checks) 
Dependent variable:  ( )t FDI log   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 




























t eedom economicfr ) log(       -0.808 
(-0.76)     
( )t stability reedom politicalf & log         -0.0007 
(-0.00)   
t efficincy government ) log(           -0.074 
(-0.33) 


































) 2003 / 2002 ( DUM   -0.152 
(-2.03)**         
) 2004 / 2003 ( DUM   -0.032 
(-0.49)         










Number of observation  513  481  450  479  481 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1), (p value)  0.022  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.005 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2), (p value)  0.522  0.539  0.414  0.501  0.543 
Hansen test of overid.  (p value)  0.583  0.441  0.578  0.606  0.346 
Wald test ( ) 0 ) log( : 1 0 = − t shadow H   (5.31)*  (4.12)**  (3.73)***  (4.00)**  (2.95)*** 
Wald test ( ) 0 : 0 = DUM H   (2.99)**  (3.53)***  (9.95)*  (5.62)*  (3.57)*** 
Notes: All models are estimated using the Arellano and Bond dynamic panel system GMM estimations 
(Stata xtabond2 command). Figures in the parentheses are t-statistics. * Significant at the 1 percent 
level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level and*** Significant at the 10 percent level. Political Freedom 
and Stability = average of voice & accountability and political stability. Government Efficiency = 
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Table 5: Countries included in the Analysis 
ALBANIA  ETHIOPIA  MARSHALL ISLANDS  SPAIN 
ALGERIA  FIJI  MAURITANIA  SRI LANKA 
ANGOLA  FINLAND  MEXICO  SWEDEN 
ARGENTINA  FRANCE  MICRONESIA  SWITZERLAND 
ARMENIA  GEORGIA  MOLDOVA  SYRIA 
AUSTRALIA  GERMANY  MONGOLIA  TAIWAN 
AUSTRIA  GHANA  MOROCCO  TANZANIA 
AZERBAIJAN  GREECE  MOZAMBIQUE  THAILAND 
BANGLADESH  GUATEMALA  NAMIBIA  TOGO 
BELARUS  GUINEA  NEPAL  TONGA 
BELGIUM  HAITI  NETHERLANDS  TUNISIA 
BENIN  HONDURAS  NEW ZEALAND  TURKEY 
BHUTAN  HONG KONG  NICARAGUA  UGANDA 
BOLIVIA  HUNGARY  NIGER  UKRAINE 
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA  INDIA  NIGERIA  UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
BOTSWANA  INDONESIA  NORWAY  UNITED KINGDOM 
BRAZIL  IRAN  OMAN  UNITED STATES 
BULGARIA  IRELAND  PAKISTAN  URUGUAY 
BURKINA FASO  ISRAEL  PALAU  UZBEKISTAN 
BURUNDI  ITALY  PANAMA  VANUATU 
CAMBODIA  JAMAICA  PAPUA NEW GUINEA  VENEZUELA 
CAMEROON  JAPAN  PARAGUAY  VIETNAM 
CANADA  JORDAN  PERU  YEMEN 
CENTRAL AFRICAN   KAZAKHSTAN  PHILIPPINES  ZAMBIA 
CHAD  KENYA  POLAND  ZIMBABWE 
CHILE  KIRIBATI  PORTUGAL   
CHINA  KOREA, SOUTH  PUERTO RICO   
COLOMBIA  KUWAIT  ROMANIA   
CONGO  KYRGYZSTAN  RUSSIA   
CONGO, Dem. Rep.  LAOS  RWANDA   
COSTA RICA  LATVIA  SAMOA   
COTE D'IVOIRE  LEBANON  SAUDI ARABIA   
CROATIA  LESOTHO  SENEGAL   
CZECH REPUBLIC  LITHUANIA  SERBIA   
DENMARK  MACEDONIA  SIERRA LEONE   
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  MADAGASCAR  SINGAPORE   
ECUADOR  MALAWI  SLOVAKIA   
EGYPT  MALAYSIA  SLOVENIA   
EL SALVADOR  MALDIVES  SOLOMON ISLANDS   
ESTONIA  MALI  SOUTH AFRICA    
 